To be an "I" means to be solitary. He who says "I" establishes a distance and draws a circle around himself. The task of solitude is the task of the "I". Only where there are individuals can there be solitude. Where there are individuals there are, however, both: the pleasure in individuality, and thus the impulse towards solitude, and the suffering of individuality, and thus the impulse away from solitude. In this process it does not matter whether one is an individual, but rather whether one feels like one and knows it.
Karl Jaspers [eines abgeschlossenen Ich] within perfected communication. However, once this path has been entered upon, solitude can in reality never again be overcome for more than moments.
It is possible to circumscribe a significant part of the problem that concerns us here using such formulas. We only approach the problems themselves, however, once we attempt to slowly capture them in a more concrete manner. We need to conceptualize this, until now abstractly formulated, movement by focusing on individual moments. Only then will it be possible to capture the potentialities of solitude and its overcoming [Aufhebung] within communication. It might be helpful to focus on two reciprocally correlated viewpoints in order to allow us to understand the individual instance: 1) With regard to the level of concrete facticity [konkreten Tatsächlichkeit], we can ask:
which "I" is solitary? When we try to clarify what we mean when we say "I" and "thou", when we ask ourselves: what is "I"?, who is "I"?, we look into an abyss: soon we realize that as "I"'s we always have in mind a schema, a conception of ourselves, a part, a type. We think, albeit perhaps completely falsely: if we abstract from the formal properties of self-consciousness
[Ichbewusstsein] (of the "I" in contrast to what is outside of it, i.e. activity, identity and continuity, simplicity), our substantive self-consciousness is oscillating. Often it is a collection of different Egos, which one can classify into groups such as "social I," "momentary I," "impressional I," "performative I," "embodied I," "sexual I," and so forth. Whenever we wish, do, or achieve something for our Ego, we do it for one or many of these perceptual schemata of our Ego. We don't know whether an "I" exists in itself. Even if it exists, we don't know it, only its surface lying over the different Egos, which-to the detriment of the authentic "I"-interest us more than does our "I". We would thus also have to get to know the types of "I"'s in order to PhaenEx thus grasp the concrete forms of solitude. This signals a way which is only meaningful when analyzing concrete instances.
2) We can ask: in which sphere of objects does communication take place? For example, in the intellectual, the erotic, or the ethical sphere, etc.? Because communication takes place only within the medium of shared objects, the attempt to establish a direct community-which again and again draws on arbitrarily discovered objects-dissolves into nothing. Therefore there is, for example, a contradiction between the solitude of intellectual-contemplative creators and the solitude of one who is active. The former can be alone. He creates his work alone. This work is valid as such and he reassures himself in this validity, even if there is no resonance (Spinoza).
The active person depends on reactions and support of other humans in order even to initiate an action. He is absolutely solitary without resonance. He is incapable of creation and cannot accomplish an assessment of the validity of his deeds (unless he resorts to delusions).
It could be objected that such a dissolution of the "I" into individual Egos and into communication within individual spheres makes it possible for someone to have all of his Egos within all spheres in a relationship to other individuals, and yet he would still be subjectively and objectively solitary. In contrast, there is the subjective experience understood as something which is momentarily alive and which may even potentially return, accompanying life. In this subjective experience the totality of "I" and thou is included and a communication beyond any topics [Gegenständlichkeit] is at least subjectively experienced. Such experiences are real
[faktisch]: they are characterized through the captivation of humans by their repercussions and their lasting impact as governed through profound forces of the soul. Goethe It is a precondition, which, depending on its course, influences everything that follows.
Understanding is no solitary force.
I am now looking for formulas to elucidate two of these forces, the will to power and to love. Based on these formulas, the contradictory types of an unconditional drive away from solitude, and that towards solitude, become understandable. It needs to be taken into account, though, that solitude as such is only a formal relationship and that the object of the drive is not solitude or communication, but substantively the human being, the task, creation, the other.
2) Power establishes an uneven hierarchy between human beings in communication.
When I keep slaves as cattle and use them as tools, I do not stand in this power relationship, but in the fully internal non-relationality of sheer violence. I stand within this power relationship, though, whenever I somehow address spiritual forces [seelische Kräfte] in the other. There is, for example, a form of communication which suspends solitude in some sense in the act of kindness towards an inferior, just as there is in the act of humility towards a superior. In this case, both escape solitude: the one escapes his individuality by way of establishing a relationship of dependence between this individuality and an authority, a sovereign, and thereby vanishes. He PhaenEx preserves individuality at the margins while having eradicated it at its root. The instincts are analogous whether he subjects himself to a leader, a master, the Catholic Church or to a tyrant.
Ultimately, he doesn't want to be an individual anymore, but a part. His conscience [Gesinnung] distinguishes him from the human being who primarily wants to remain who he is or wants to become-though this self were but a grain of sand compared to a rock-a disposition, which must seem to the former as proud arrogance and as a form of radical evil. The superior, in contrast, escapes solitude by assimilating all others, by subjecting them as parts to himself, but also by tolerating them.
He escapes solitude by expanding his self into a giant organism in which all others are but parts of him, by way of increasing his solitude into world solitude, outside of which nothing remains.
Neither form can ever reach this end. The one who subjects himself necessarily learns that the superior does not last forever and is not indispensable in his superiority. He learns that the superior does not possess the qualities he had expected from him, or that the superior cannot let him be as an assimilated part, but instead destroys him. Therefore the inferior subjects himself to a God rather than a human being or a human institution, derived from this God. His solitude culminates in the religious. He thus resigns himself to the penury of being in a state of subjugation-which he affirms as a state of subjugation-in this world. he longs for an enemy who is equal to him and he feels it is tragic that he has to destroy what he is also capable of respecting.
Here, the need for the other who is on a par with him is present in the paradoxical form of desire for an enemy. This need for the other at eye level is a constitutive characteristic of love: The struggle in love does not draw on all means. Its morality consists in letting the subject matter and the individual speak for him or herself. It does not subject them, but awakens.
It does not use violence, but assessment, not deception and stratagems, but openness, truth and authenticity [Echtheit] . Karl Jaspers These constructed types are still quite far from reality. They are completely one-sided and pushed to the extreme. Furthermore, they lack concrete exemplification because they have always been talked about as if the active and intended "I" would be total and absolute. However, I do think that the typical characteristics we arrived at are helpful in grasping the concrete phenomena more quickly and with greater precision.
Therefore let us now turn directly to our immediate experiences. We find in all of life a dignity of solitude, a valuation in favour of solitude and, by the same token, a passionate or desperate drive away from solitude.
The dignity of solitude has, in its entirety, a double source: it is the last reflection of a softened, heroic type of human being inside of us. The dignity of solitude becomes a scar, but partially experienced as an expression of our power and egoistic instinct [EigenwillenInstinktes]: in it there is a distancing, a moving away from, a defiant being for oneself in opposition to other humans whom we cannot assimilate. It is a miniature defiance, which might be similar to the larger defiance that the superior harbours towards God. Within such a state of defiance one remains silent, because one wants to prove to oneself and to others that one is noble (Nietzsche) . Inside oneself one enjoys superiority by remaining silent when no superiority is possible in the external world. To promote silence in this sense, which is often grounded on motives both aesthetic and of propriety, means to promote nobility in the sense of the spirit of power and of being superior. This gesture of noble silence saves one from obtrusions, undignified situations, disgrace, obvious and externally concealed developments of one's own soul, friction and trials of the self, inferiority, etc. In fact, it saves one from all of these in a relatively cheap kind of way, through not doing anything, for which one is rewarded with the pleasant, uplifting feeling of achievement, of counting for more. Even if the discipline of PhaenEx remaining silent is often extremely strenuous, it becomes relatively easy precisely because power instincts are being satisfied. And if it should become necessary to remain silent for other reasons, the power instincts easily seize the opportunity and are thus again satisfied.
Another source of perpetuated solitude is the intention not to lower oneself: human beings are only willing to give up solitude, to speak, to allow for, and endure complete openness since there is nothing that could not be imitated, simplicity, authenticity, spiritual poverty, and atmosphere are finally created and desired. Consequently, an inauthentic authenticity emerges and it becomes almost impossible to orient oneself in the net of illusory and frequently selfrefuting spectacles. Since the most elementary needs for material self-preservation as well as the other egoistic interests sustain themselves the longest, it is possible to witness the most solemn community next to complete lovelessness in one human being. In this case the drive away from solitude takes on the polymorphism of the inauthentic, which is almost impossible to constrain.
It is thus the most heterogeneous forces which usurp the communicative impulse-just as previously it was the drive to solitude: sexuality, the need for power, the need for intoxication, The psychologist, however, who follows the Jesus-type will satisfy his patient. He will say: solitude is overcome by way of a loss of individuality, a condition, which can only be sustained in hypnotic or erotic dependence. At the same time he develops that well-known caricature of Christ in his being and his mind, a caricature that is a product of our time. It is selfevident that it does not correspond to the historical image of Jesus, because it does not seem to be realistic. The psychologist following the Socratic type is in an almost permanently paradoxical situation. He will be able to find only relatively few who would be adequate patients for him. For, every urge for authoritative bonds and one-sided self-revelation, for love without individuality and equality, motivates so many to consult the psychologist instead of the Catholic Church and, should they ever meet a Socratic type, they will not get their money's worth.
Let us now pursue further the possibilities of communication in the sphere of a love, which allows the preservation of individuality. Let us recall that earlier we stipulated an infinite passage, which would never reach an end in spite of moments of fulfillment. These moments should not be taken as final realizations which one could rest upon. What is necessary at this point is to call to mind some inevitable features of this kind of communication, which could all lead to a certain form of congealment or emptying out, to a dead-end: to complete emotional devotion. Though it too requires the rational apparatus, it is destroyed by everyday instrumental thinking, which is always directed by interests and not through love.
The fixation on the rational apparatus increases deception by mistaking saying for being.
People express how much they like each other, understand each other; they praise the other, like to spend time with the other, etc.. Being expresses itself only infallibly within experience; it has no further need of such abstract words and formulas.
The rational apparatus as such is an indispensable means. Without it there would be no communication whatsoever. However, if one places it at the center, one has entered an impasse wherein understanding and love cease to exist.
3) Understanding and love never become ultimate facts or a lasting and secure possession. Rather, they need to be achieved again and again, if they are to remain alive at all.
They are only achieved through struggle, through spiritual struggle, by way of giving oneself over and listening, by grasping for the spiritual root of the other, in the attempt literally to question his existence and in the living reaction to such attempts from the other side. It is not a struggle for power, but a struggle of positive, concrete forces, which come to light only through the practices mentioned and only thereby obtain expression-just as, indeed, thoughts, deeds, and plans may find their ground in such a communication from the depth of souls.
Two people meet. Though they did not know each other before, they understand each other using but few words. They experience a surprisingly quick sense of harmony. Allusions suffice. It is obvious: there is understanding. It feels as if both belonged to each other since birth. PhaenEx
Apart from the fact that it might be an illusion due to an arbitrarily shared concern for concrete contents, such experience only provides a basis on which continuing struggle needs to take place.
Non-linguistic understanding is always the result of such struggles and efforts, or it is a lucky starting point. It never turns into final possession. Understanding and love entail an infinite path.
They flourish always afresh, starting from the earlier basis of moments of fulfillment. They are begun over and over again. They are never conclusive, however vast and firm their foundation. Subjective and objective solitude must have been raised to the extreme in individual instances.
The religious can thereby turn into a means by which to intensify solitude just as it serves as a means to protect against the ultimate solitude. PhaenEx
Here, in the religious, things are determined at ever higher levels, whose final position the human being takes up in the question of breadth of vision [Weitanschauungsfrage] . Is there something ultimate in the "I"?, has the absolute been grasped at its root here?, or is the "I" simply a phenomenon which, in the last instance, dissolves? Is the "I" dependent or independent?
Correspondingly: does the "I" increase solitude inside of itself to the level of world solitude-be it that of the hero or that of the human who stands in the communication of love? Or is solitude overcome in the destruction of the "I," in the elimination of the phenomena rather than in the idea of the totality of the individual? Practically speaking, this means that the "I" either looks ahead in order to travel the path of power and love by expanding and intensifying its substance or, in turning backwards, it searches for the way and thereby loses its individuality again, replacing it with authority, subjection, institution, etc.
Once again we have run into the construction of extreme types. To conclude, let us compare some forms of solitude, which we can easily interpret by way of the categories we have acquired:
1) Solitude as a consequence of fate following the deepest understanding. The other might be dead. What was once experienced becomes a yardstick for everything that follows.
Only by achieving the same degree is it possible for the human being to get out of his solitude.
Otherwise, he would experience this stepping out as a defilement [Befleckung] . Not solitary when reliving the unerasable experience of relationship, he becomes ever more solitary objectively. Subjectively, however, he experiences his life as the only place where solitude is not.
2) Solitude as a consequence of a fateful isolation. The depth of understanding and love has never been found. One avoids compromises and imperfection. Religious communities, Karl Jaspers natural understanding, or in any other sphere in which the soul suddenly emerges, will be found to be a meager substitute that stirs or moves [rührend] the observer. what is essential. One says everything, just never the truth. It is the frozen isolation of the whole human being for the benefit of the practical Ego, whereas the inevitable consequence of understanding is hated like death: the understanding of one's own irreparable defects, the consciousness of one's own guilt, guilt consciousness as shock and despair. However, this is also the only way that profound self-cultivation begins. The soul suffers tremendously on this path, but it also blossoms as soul.
4) Finally, let us consider the type of the most extreme solitude. This solitude can no longer wish for anything but the disappearance of all things. We find it embodied in Goethe's harpist. "I see nothing ahead, nothing behind," he exclaimed, "than an infinite night in which I am in the most dreadful solitude; the only feeling I have is that of guilt. ... In this night no divine light ray appears to me. ... Nothing seems more horrible than friendship and love; for they alone make me wish that the appearances surrounding me might be real..." 
